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Abstract. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are used for infrastructure projects, but they usually involve risk because of 
their complexity. The construction and operation stages are the core of successful infrastructure PPP projects. This study 
analysed the efficiency and determinants of the construction and operation stages of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects 
conducted by thirty provinces from 2008–2013. During the five years examined, the efficiency of infrastructure PPP pro-
jects in the construction stage exhibited a downward spiral, but showed a gradual upward trend in the operation stage. The 
results showed that government supervision was one of the most significant positive influences on construction efficiency, 
while risk allocation had a greater positive impact on efficiency during the operation stage. The evidence in this study is 
impactful because it provides insights for practitioners regarding key determinants for improving efficiency in the con-
struction and operation stages of infrastructure PPP projects.
Keywords: infrastructure PPP projects, government supervision, risk allocation, construction stage, operation stage.
Introduction
Public private partnerships (PPPs) have become increas-
ingly popular for the construction of essential public in-
frastructure, particularly in developing countries such 
as China. For large-scale infrastructure projects, this as-
sociation between the public and private sector provides 
a means for procuring financing and resources, with re-
sulting social and economic benefits for both sides. The 
partnership comprises a long-term contractual arrange-
ment between public and private sector entities. Various 
types of contractual arrangements can be made, such as 
the design-build-operate (DBO), build-operate-transfer 
(BOT), and build-transfer (BT) methods (Tserng, Russell, 
Hsu, & Lin, 2012). However, because of increasing com-
plexity and the sectors involved, existing infrastructure 
PPP projects have been plagued by risks and have suffered 
often from poor performance in terms of cost overruns 
and scheduling delays particularly in developing countries 
(Xu, Lu, Chan, Skibniewski, & Yeung, 2012). Hence, PPP 
projects practice has become a focus of study by scholars 
in recent years, particularly with regard to risk allocation 
(Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010; Shrestha, Chan, Aibinu, 
Chen, & Martek, 2017), critical successful factors (CSFs) 
for PPP projects (Galilea & Medda, 2010; Moszoro, 2014; 
Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Liu, Wang, & Wilkinson, 2016).
Although the normative literature on identification of 
CSFs for PPPs provides in-depth insights into the project 
management of infrastructure PPP projects, yet a rel-
evant question still remains unanswered; that is: “what 
are the critical influencing factors for the efficiency of 
infrastructure PPP projects by stages?”. Essentially, it 
would be very challenging for practitioners to improve 
the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects without a 
thorough and indepth knowledge on the efficiency and 
determinants of infrastructure PPP projects by stages. 
Though there exist extensive bodies of literature on im-
proved approaches for evaluating the efficiency of infra-
structure projects. Examples include the Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) production function (Munnell & Cook, 1990), 
cost-benefit models (Girard, Gruber, & Hurst, 1995) and 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Karkazis & Thanas-
soulis, 1998; Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Wanke, 2013). 
However, the above research focused mainly on evaluat-
ing the investment efficiency of the projects and selected 
only economic indicators. In addition, there have been 
heated debates regarding the assessment of infrastruc-
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tor participation in infrastructure development. Hence, we 
examined evidence that could be deemed to have special 
value for improving the performance of infrastructure PPP 
projects in China and other countries.
This study’s findings also have practical implications 
for the public sector and for private investors, including 
property scientists interested in PPPs. Specifically, the 
findings can inform practitioners about strategic man-
agement that should be adopted for public participation 
to meet stakeholders’ expectations when implementing 
infrastructure PPPs in the construction stage. Moreover, 
government guarantee is an effective and common way to 
control risks in the operation stage of PPP projects. The 
findings suggest there is a significant social impact when 
the responsibilities for property management are clearly 
divided between practitioners in infrastructure PPP pro-
jects. In addition, since the stages of PPP projects have 
different characteristics, researchers and property scien-
tists should differentiate between them when analysing the 
efficiency and determinants of infrastructure PPP projects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1 provides a literature review. Section 2 describes 
our research methodology and model specifications. In 
Section 3, we provide an analysis of our empirical results 
regarding efficiency and the determinants of infrastruc-
ture PPP projects in the construction and operation stag-
es. Last section provides our conclusions and recommen-
dations based on the results of this research.
1. Literature review
1.1. Efficiency evaluation of infrastructure PPP 
projects
Influenced by Keynesian theories, the main source of in-
frastructure investment in the mid-20th century was the 
government. Scholars focused on investigating the impact 
of government infrastructure investment on economic 
growth through the Cobb–Douglas (CD) production 
function, cost-benefit models, and vector regression mod-
els. Usually, input was measured in terms of infrastructure 
investment by the public, labour, and technology sectors, 
while output was viewed in terms of GDP (Munnell & 
Cook, 1990; Girard et al., 1995; Groote, Jacobs, & Sturm, 
1999). With the introduction of new public management 
theories at the end of the 20th century, challenges were 
raised concerning the efficiency of government invest-
ment. Scholars began to explore private capital partici-
pation through multi-input and output methods such as 
DEA. For example, Karkazis and Thanassoulis (1998) 
chose central government subsidies in Northern Greece 
as input variables, and selected the investment proportion 
of the private sector in the first, second, and tertiary in-
dustries as output variables.
At the beginning of the 21st century, a few scholars 
began to focus on industrial analysis of PPP projects. 
To estimate PPP project efficiency at the industrial level, 
they chose as inputs capital investment and the number 
ture PPP projects using qualitative methods, such as 
institutional analysis (Zhang, Gao, Feng, & Sun, 2015). 
In this regard, very limited empirical research has been 
undertaken to explore and identify the efficiency and 
its determinants of infrastructure PPP projects (Chan, 
Yeung, Calvin, Wang, & Ke, 2011). However, consider-
ing the uniqueness of PPP projects, it is likely their ef-
ficiency determinants will differ from the traditionally 
procured projects (Akintoye, Hardcastle, Beck, Chinyio, 
& Asenova, 2003). Therefore, a thorough discussion and 
empirical research on efficiency and determinants analy-
sis of infrastructure PPP projects in the construction and 
operation stages is required to complement and further 
expand both practitioners and researchers understanding 
of project management of infrastructure PPP projects.
Against this backdrop, this paper aimed to explore 
the efficiency of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects and 
identify the key determinants for maintaining good per-
formance that are an integral and critical part of all global 
infrastructure PPP projects. To achieve this goal, first we 
evaluated the efficiency of a group of Chinese infrastruc-
ture PPP projects conducted by thirty provincial govern-
ments from 2008–2013. All the projects were in either the 
construction stage or the operation stage based on the 
two-stage DEA model. Then we applied a Tobit regression 
model to examine the impact of government supervision 
and risk management on the efficiency of these projects in 
both the construction and operation stages.
This study contributes to the existing literature in 
several ways. First, this study is the first to provide new 
empirical evidence for analysing the efficiency and deter-
minants of infrastructure PPP projects in the construc-
tion and operation stages. Second, given the “black box” 
of the operation process for infrastructure PPP projects, 
this study aimed to fill this gap by using a two-stage DEA 
model to evaluate efficiency in both the construction and 
operation stages. Finally, this study considered the com-
plex characteristics of infrastructure PPP projects in Chi-
na and established a framework for assessing the efficiency 
and determinants of projects. This approach complements 
and extends the work of Tang, Zhen, and Yi-Dong (2008), 
Li et al. (2009), and Wanke (2013), as well as other stud-
ies evaluating the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects.
This study is important because PPPs have been widely 
used to deliver infrastructure projects and provide public 
services in China since the reforms and the opening up 
in the 1970s. The development of PPPs in China has gone 
through three stages: exploratory (mid-1980s to 1999), 
promotion (early 2000s to 2012), and generalization (2013 
to the present). The Shenzhen Shajiao B Power Plant, con-
structed in the mid-1980s, is considered the start of China’s 
adoption of PPPs. According to the latest statistics from the 
China Public Private Partnerships Center (CPPPC), there 
were 13,554 PPP projects in the national PPP comprehen-
sive project database, with a total investment of 16.3 tril-
lion RMB by August 16, 2017. China is now considered to 
be one of the world’s most active markets for private sec-
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of employees in certain industries. In addition, they used 
the amount of equipment, physical size of equipment, 
and number of users in the industry as outputs (Koski & 
Majumdar, 2000; Ariff, Cabanda, & Sathye, 2009). Some 
investigators focused on comparing the efficiency of inter–
regional projects. Afonso and Fernandes (2008) used the 
BCC–DEA model to measure the investment efficiency 
of infrastructure projects from five regions in Portugal in 
2001. Per capita municipal expenditures were chosen as 
the input, while investment in sanitation, road infrastruc-
tures, and other infrastructure construction were used as 
the output (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008). To measure the 
investment efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects, Tang 
et al. (2008) chose government and private investment by 
infrastructure sectors such as electrical power, transpor-
tation, and water as input, and adopted the GDP growth 
rate as output. Li et  al. (2009) evaluated and sorted the 
investment efficiency of infrastructure projects conducted 
by provinces or cities in China. Taking external environ-
mental factors into account, other researchers also added 
social benefits and foreign direct investment (FDI) as in-
put indicators (Hu et al., 2014).
Despite the increased use of DEA to measure the ef-
ficiency of infrastructure projects in recent years (e.g., 
Vitner, Rozenes, & Spraggett, 2006; Afonso & Fernandes, 
2008; Hung, Lu, & Wang, 2010; Xu & Yeh, 2014), few 
studies recognized explicitly that some intermediate out-
puts are produced and consumed between infrastructure 
projects’ processes. While the studies based on DEA cited 
above provided meaningful insights regarding the perfor-
mance of infrastructure PPP projects, some recent devel-
opments in DEA have enabled the study of infrastructure 
project efficiency through examination of the internal as-
sociation of factors related to final efficiency (Yao, 2009; 
Zhu, 2011; Wanke, 2013). For example, Wanke (2013) ap-
plied a two-stage DEA model to calculate the efficiency 
of Brazilian projects divided into a physical infrastructure 
stage and shipment consolidation stage.
1.2. Factors influencing the efficiency of 
infrastructure PPP projects
During the first decade of the 21st century, scholars re-
lied primarily on mathematical economic models and case 
study methods to analyze the impact of contract design on 
the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects. Their research 
showed that contract design is one of the most critical fac-
tors affecting the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects. 
For example, some research indicated that there is incom-
plete and unreasonable allocation of risk in existing con-
tracts (Debande, 2002). Along with the established theo-
retical framework of the efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects, other scholars adopted empirical research meth-
ods, such as case analysis and questionnaires. Their research 
focused on the influence of government behaviour on the 
process of managing infrastructure PPP projects, such as 
the degree of government corruption (Hammami, Ruhashy-
ankiko, & Yehoue, 2006), rotation of officials (Martimort & 
Straub, 2009), project bidding (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 
2008), and regulatory mechanisms for pricing (Chowdhury 
& Charoenngam, 2009), among others.
Since 2010, the diversification of participants in infra-
structure PPP projects has grown with time. With the guid-
ance of stakeholder theory, research concentrated on the 
factors that affect the efficiency of infrastructure PPP pro-
jects, such as risk allocation and the responsibility of third-
party supervision. Galilea and Medda (2010) found that 
one of the main reasons for failure of infrastructure PPP 
projects is diversification of investors. While the presence 
of diverse creditors can be helpful in terms of increased 
supervision and improved efficiency, their participation 
also increases both communications costs and the number 
of incidences of disputes. Chowdhury and Charoenngam 
(2009) emphasized the value of involving rating agencies, 
multilateral development banks, and other international 
institutions to buffer the political risk that may be associ-
ated with developing countries. Their involvement ensures 
some protection for investors, attracts foreign investment, 
and lowers financing costs for infrastructure PPP projects. 
Moszoro (2014) argued that government ownership of SPV 
companies can result in complex management structures 
and lower efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects. How-
ever, it is optimal for governments to participate in these 
equity investments to ensure lower financing costs, as well 
as a more stable economic and legal environment for the 
SPV companies (Moszoro, 2014).
In contrast, research findings regarding the factors in-
fluencing the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects are 
scattered. Only a few scholars emphasized the effects of 
government compensation and government credit on the 
efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in China (Zhang, 
2014). As a consequence of Chinese public ownership, 
decision-making for infrastructure PPP projects is still 
government-lead, with the private sector gradually filter-
ing into infrastructure PPP projects.
2. Research methodology
2.1. Data envelopment analysis
Data envelopment analysis (DEA), a well-known method 
for measuring the efficiency of decision-making units 
(DMUs), was introduced more than 40 years ago when 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) presented their CCR 
model. With this model, they could transform the frac-
tional linear measure of efficiency into a linear program-
ming model. DEA, as a research field, has grown rapidly 
because of its unique ability to measure the efficiency of 
multiple-input, multiple-output DMUs without assigning 
prior weights to the input and output. DEA can be used 
as a decision-analysis tool in several areas because it does 
not focus on finding universal relationships among all units 
under assessment in the sample. Rather, DEA allows every 
unit in the dataset to have its own production function, and 
then it evaluates the efficiency of that single unit by com-
paring it with the efficiency of other units in the dataset.
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More specifically, DEA classifies all units into two 
groups: efficient with a 100% efficiency score and ineffi-
cient with a less than 100% efficiency score. DEA is used 
to establish a best-practice group among a set of observed 
units and to identify units that are inefficient compared to 
the best-practice group. DEA also indicates the magnitude 
of inefficiencies and possible improvements for inefficient 
units. After Charnes et al. (1978) first proposed the CCR–
DEA model in 1978, which takes constant returns to scale 
as its premise, DEA models suitable for various situations 
gradually emerged, such as the BCC model (with vari-
able returns to scale) and three-stage DEA model (Fried, 
Lovell, Schmidt, & Yaisawarng, 2002).
The DEA model mentioned above is designed to meas-
ure the efficiency of the initial investment of each DMU, 
and the final output is based on the evaluation of the pro-
ject. The DMU itself is regarded as a single “black box” 
structure, so the model ignores the internal process of the 
DMU occurring between the interaction and transforma-
tion processes. The black box hypothesis was previously 
considered one of the advantages of the DEA method. 
However, in the actual practice of efficiency evaluation, 
more and more scholars found that intermediate produc-
tion processes, consisting mostly of economic activities, 
have an important influence on the whole production pro-
cess (Zhu, 2000). In other words, overall low efficiency 
may be the result of one or more processes that were not 
evaluated because they were in the black box. Therefore, 
it is necessary to open the black box to carry out a more 
detailed analysis of the effectiveness of each phase.
2.2. Model specification
2.2.1. Two-stage DEA model
Broadly speaking, the life cycle of an infrastructure PPP 
project can be divided into three stages: construction, op-
eration, and transfer (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Cheung, 2009). 
Each stage is interrelated and affects the others, and the 
overall efficiency of an infrastructure PPP project is the 
result of the integration of each stage. The largest amounts 
of input and output are concentrated in the construction 
stage and operation stage. Taking into account the avail-
ability of data and the complexities of infrastructure PPP 
projects in China, this paper uses the two-stage DEA 
model to calculate the efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects in both the construction and operation stages.
In the two-stage DEA model, decision-making units 
(DMUs) can be divided into a two-stage structure in 
which the output of the first sub-stage is used as input 
for the second sub-stage (Chen et al., 2009). In summary, 
input funding (investment) for infrastructure PPP projects 
is used in Stage 1 to construct the infrastructure. Then the 
infrastructure moves into Stage 2, the operation stage, cre-
ating economic and social benefits. This two-stage process 
is shown in Figure 1.
In the two-stage DEA model, considering the relation-
ship between the overall process and the sub-processes, 
there are n DMUs. In the first stage, each DMU has m in-
puts denoted as Xm, and each DMU has d outputs denoted 
as Zd. The second stage regards the first stage outputs as 
the inputs, and the final output is denoted as Ys. In this 
study, Xj = (x1j, x2j, …, xmj)T, Zj = (z1j, z2j, …, zdj)T, and 
Yj = (y1j, y2j ,…, ysj)T. The weight of each input and out-
put variable is u, v, and w, respectively. E0 represents the 
overall efficiency of the DMUs, and 10E , 20E represent the 
sub-process efficiency. Thus, the efficiency model of the 
whole process is shown as (1):
 







































 ≥ ≥ ≥
  (1)
/ 1, 1, ,
/ 1, 1, ,
. .








u Y v X j n
w Z v X j n
s t
u Y w Z j n
u v w





 ≥ ≥ ≥
Taking the value of 0
0
1  1/ T
T
t t v X
v X
= = , and setting 
the values of ω = tv, π = tw, and μ = tu, we transform the 
fractional programming model into a linear programming 
model shown as (2):
0 0














Y X j n
Z X j n




μ −ω ≤ =

π −ω ≤ =

μ − π ≤ =
 ≥ ≥ ≥
 (2)
The optimal solutions ω*, π*, μ* can be obtained by the 
above model, and then the efficiency value of the DMUs 
can be E0 = μ*TY0, 10E = π*TZ0, and 20E  = μ*TY0/π*TZ0. 
Thus E0 = 
1





Economic and social 
benets 
Input funding for 
infrastructure 
Figure 1. Flow chart of an infrastructure project
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2.2.2. Two-stage DEA model
In the process of evaluating the efficiency of infrastructure 
PPP projects, the two-stage DEA model uses controllable 
input and output indicators, without considering other 
uncontrollable external environmental factors. Because 
the efficiency scores of infrastructure PPP projects are all 
[0, 1], they are part continuous and part discrete distribu-
tion data. Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) are 
no longer suitable for estimating the regression coefficient, 
and the estimation results may appear biased and incon-
sistent. It is necessary to introduce the Tobit regression 
method to estimate the regression coefficient.
The Tobit regression model, first proposed by Tobin 
(1956), is an approach in which the dependent variables 
are limited. The Tobit model is shown as (3):
0
T
i i iY X= b + b +μ∑ , (3)
where: Yi is the efficiency value of the previous calcula-
tions; Xi is the explanatory variable; bT is the unknown 
parameter vector, and μi is the residual term that follows 
the standard normal distribution. Because the fixed effect 
model of Tobit regression is biased under the maximum 
likelihood estimation, this research uses the Tobit regres-
sion model with random effects.
2.3. Sample, data, and variables
2.3.1. Selection of input and output indicators
(1) Input indicators
PPPs can be defined broadly or narrowly. The broad 
definition of PPPs covers the various types of cooperation 
between the government and the private sector, while the 
narrow definition of PPPs focuses closely on comprehen-
sive, long-term partnerships. In 2015, the Office of the 
State Council issued the Notice on Guiding Opinions on 
Promoting Cooperation Mode between Government and 
Social Capital in the Field of Public Service (No. 42). It not-
ed that PPP projects are public services provided by social 
capital, and the government pays into social capital accord-
ing to the performance of PPP projects to ensure that social 
capital can obtain reasonable returns. The key demarcation 
between PPP projects and traditional projects concerns 
whether social capital can participate in traditional govern-
ment-funded projects (e.g., power plants, tap water projects, 
and land development) and share decision-making and rev-
enue rights. In traditional projects, the government assumes 
the triple role of direct investor, borrower, and manager, 
and it directly intervenes in the construction of traditional 
projects. Thus, the participation space for the private sector 
is very narrow. The risks of traditional projects are almost 
entirely borne by the government. Traditional projects pay 
more attention to the financing of the construction stage 
but less attention to the economic and social benefits of 
the operation stage (Xu et al., 2012). In PPP projects, social 
capital enters the whole process of the project (construc-
tion, operation, and transfer stages), while the public sector 
performs the more macrolevel roles of public services, su-
pervision, and management. PPP projects establish a risk-
sharing relationship between government and the private 
sector (Zhang, Chan, Feng, Duan, & Ke, 2016).
Because of the involvement of the private sector, Chi-
na’s infrastructure projects are arranged primarily through 
application of the basic BT and BOT construction and 
concession models. As the research object for this paper, 
we chose the macroeconomic data for construction of in-
frastructure PPP projects conducted by thirty provincial 
governments (as described further in Section 2.3.3). For 
the two-stage DEA analysis, infrastructure investment 
served as an input indicator for the construction stage of 
infrastructure PPP projects, divided into government fis-
cal investment, government debt investment, and invest-
ment from the private sector.
(2) Intermediate output indicators
The intermediate output indicators were based on the 
construction levels of infrastructure PPP projects. Because 
different types of infrastructure indicators for different units 
cannot be added together simply, this research used compre-
hensive indicators to reflect the overall level of infrastruc-
ture construction by principal component analysis (Zhang, 
2014). Principal component analysis is more representative 
than single infrastructure indicators (J. Zhang, Gao, Fu, & 
H. Zhang, 2007; Zhang et al., 2015). The comprehensive indi-
cators of specific intermediate outputs are shown in Table 1.
We performed the KMO test and Bartley’s test of sphe-
ricity as part of the principle component analysis. By ap-
plying these methods, we gathered the rate of cumulative 
Table 1. Local infrastructure construction intermediate output indicators
Infrastructure system Specific indicators Unit of measurement
Traffic system Road length (X1) Kilometre
The number of bridges (X2) A bridge
Energy Total electricity consumption (X3) Million kilowatt hours
Total gas supply (X4) Million cubic metres
Communication The number of mobile phone users (X5) Million households
Water resources The total water supply (X6) Million cubic metres
The total amount of sewage treatment (X7) Million cubic metres
Ecological environment The number of public toilets (X8) Units
The number of green areas (X9) Hectare
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variance and the covariance matrix, as well as the factor 
score and the factor score coefficient matrix. This research 
presents some key data sorted by years, as shown in Ta-
ble 2, Table 3, and Table 4.
As shown in Table 2, the statistical values of the KMO 
test in each year were above 0.7, and all the values of Sig. 
in the Bartlett sphericity test were 0. None of the variables 
can exist independently, which indicated that the principal 
component analysis method was suitable.
The analysis results showed that there was only one 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 each year, and 
the cumulative contribution rate was about 80%. The fac-
tor basically contained all the indicators to reflect the in-
formation, so by that reckoning, the first factor could be 
the principal component factor index. The characteristic 
values and contribution rates of the main factors for each 
year are shown in Table 4.
Using Table 4, this paper could get the comprehensive 
value of the local infrastructure construction for each year. 
For example, the infrastructure construction level by local 
governments in 2008 was the total of 0.950X1 + 0.840X2 + 
0.932X3 + 0.337X4 + 0.931X5 + 0.918X6 + 0.967X7 + 
0.787X8 + 0.979X9. The calculation would be similar for 
each of the other years.
(3) Output indicators
The final output indicators included both the econom-
ic and social benefits brought by the completion of in-
frastructure PPP projects. Economic benefits reflected the 
economic growth brought by improvements from infra-
structure PPP projects that advance the province’s produc-
tive capacity and investment environment. Infrastructure 
investment provided direct economic support for a long 
time into the future. Social benefits, also known as indi-
rect economic benefits, focused on the role of sustainable 
infrastructure for social progress and development (Li 
et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2015). Different types of infrastruc-
ture improvements resulted in different social benefits. It 
is difficult to determine the role played by infrastructure 
in these types of output indicators. Instead, following the 
research of Li et al. (2009), we used the level of regional 
urbanization as a proxy variable showing the local social 
environment. We here used the proportion of urban pop-
ulation as the specific measurement.
To sum up, the input and output indicators for the 
efficiency of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects in 
both the construction and operation stages are shown 
in Table 5.
Table 2. Results of principal component analysis–KMO and Bartlett tests
Inspection content 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sampling sufficiency
KMO measurement
0.753 0.761 0.740 0.782 0.808 0.820
Bartlett sphericity 
test
Approximate Chi square 400.830 403.973 440.117 443.582 449.518 454.789
df 36 36 36 36 36 36
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3. Principal component analysis–cumulative variance contribution rate
Inspection content 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Extract sum of squares 
load
Factor eigenvalue 6.814 6.894 6.971 7.335 7.331 7.263
% of the variance 75.707 76.598 77.454 81.495 81.450 80.704
% of the cumulative 75.707 76.598 77.454 81.495 81.450 80.704
Table 4. Principal component analysis results – component matrix
Inspection content 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
X1 0.950 0.940 0.948 0.945 0.949 0.943
X2 0.840 0.849 0.822 0.823 0.826 0.821
X3 0.932 0.929 0.931 0.923 0.923 0.923
X4 0.337 0.372 0.385 0.657 0.656 0.640
X5 0.931 0.939 0.952 0.955 0.951 0.938
X6 0.918 0.930 0.940 0.950 0.954 0.950
X7 0.967 0.966 0.971 0.975 0.965 0.957
X8 0.787 0.810 0.838 0.879 0.882 0.895
X9 0.979 0.975 0.973 0.973 0.971 0.969
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2.3.2. Variables in the Tobit model
(1) Government supervision. Regulation of infrastructure 
PPP projects included bidding, pricing, service supervision, 
and other considerations. Taking the availability of data into 
account, this paper focused mainly on the influence of fi-
nancial audits of local governments and corruption levels 
(Grajzl & Murrel, 2007; Li, Ng, & Skitmore, 2013; Liu & Lin, 
2012). The financial audits were reflected by the number of 
violations of local financial rules, and the corruption levels 
were measured by using the number of cases of corruption 
and bribery involving public officials.
In addition, this paper used public participation to 
evaluate the level of external oversight. Under ordinary 
circumstances, this variable would be measured by the 
volume of petitions or letters (Asiedu & Deffor, 2017). 
However, the China State Letters offices stopped publish-
ing data about the number of letters in March 2013. As 
an alternative, we used local environmental petitions to 
measure the approximate level of public participation in 
infrastructure PPP projects conducted by each province.
The efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in the 
construction stage depended largely on whether the bid-
ding system was transparent or whether there was any op-
portunity for collusion between authorities. If there were 
any regulatory loopholes, tendering agencies and bidders 
could be tempted to avoid the bidding process or conduct 
false bidding, which was an obvious problem (Osei-Kyei & 
Chan, 2018a). Therefore, government supervision would 
have a more significant impact on the construction stage.
(2) Risk allocation. Local governments could spread 
the financial risks of direct subsidies and the operating 
risks by signing long-term contracts with private sector 
companies. This paper used government subsidies re-
ceived by utility companies to approximate the financial 
support level of local governments. As for risk taking, this 
paper used a privatisation index as measurement (Zhang, 
2014). The Privatisation Index measurement divides in-
frastructure PPP projects recorded in the World Bank PPI 
database into 10 categories, scored from 1 to 10 points, 
according to their implementation mode, from outsourced 
to fully private. The lower the degree of private capital par-
ticipation, or the higher the government risk-taking, the 
lower the Privatisation Index value. In this way, the aver-
Table 5. Input and output indicators of the two-stage efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in China
Indicators Contents Measurement
Input Financial investment Infrastructure investments from central and local financing
Government debt investment Infrastructure investments from government loans and bonds
Private investment Infrastructure investments from foreign sources, raised by the 
private sector and other sources
Intermediate output Construction level of infrastructure Integrated construction level indicators introduced through 
principal component analysis
Output Economic benefits Regional per capita GDP, FDI, and fiscal income
Social benefits Proportion of urban population
age operation risk-taking level of each province is calculat-
ed. In this study, therefore, the Privatisation Index is stated 
against the operation risk for local governments. As in 
many other economies, the introduction of private capital 
into once state-controlled sectors has involved significant 
political and economic risks (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
Since the operation stage of infrastructure PPP projects 
generally has a long duration, that stage faces a variety of 
political risks, including policy changes, political oppo-
sition, and officials’ term limits, among other issues (Su, 
Mitchell, & Sirgy, 2007). PPPs allow local governments to 
transfer more operation risks to the private sector (Ham-
mami et al., 2006). In other words, the Privatisation Index 
value indicates the operating risk of local governments. In 
infrastructure PPP projects, a higher Privatisation Index 
value means the private sector bears a greater operation 
risk and local governments have less resource commit-
ment (Zhang, 2014). Thus, private investors must config-
ure a contract that clearly shares risk with the government. 
Accordingly, risk allocation has the most significant effect 
on the operation stage.
(3) Control variables. When selecting control variables, 
we identified four significant considerations. First, the in-
stitutional environment of infrastructure PPP projects is 
different in each province. Accordingly, it was necessary 
for local governments to promulgate a sufficient number of 
policies to monitor and evaluate the institutional environ-
ment. Second, a high degree of financial autonomy meant 
stronger financial power, ensuring the implementation of 
infrastructure PPP projects with more adequate financial 
support. Third, areas with greater economic openness may 
be more receptive to absorbing foreign investment in do-
mestic infrastructure projects. Finally, as the local financial 
market developed, the ability to provide adequate third-
party financing could improve as well. Therefore, for this 
paper we selected four control variables, including the 
number of policies relating to infrastructure PPP projects, 
the degree of financial autonomy of the local government, 
openness, and financial development. We standardized all 
the explanatory variables to ensure they fell into the (0, 1) 
interval. According to the above analyses, all factors influ-
encing the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in both 
the construction and operation stages are shown in Table 6.
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2.3.3. Sample and data
For this research, we selected infrastructure PPP projects 
developed in thirty provinces in China as the objects of 
study. Projects in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
were excluded because data from those areas were incom-
plete. Our data were derived from nine sources. Input and 
intermediate output data were gathered from the China 
Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook, and output data 
were from the China Statistical Yearbook. Data concern-
ing the number of local financial violations were taken 
from the China Audit Yearbook, the number of local en-
vironmental petitions was acquired from the China Envi-
ronment Statistical Yearbook, and the number of incidents 
of corruption and bribery of public officials was gathered 
from the China Attorney Yearbook. Financial risk data 
were provided by the CSMAR database, and operating risk 
data were from the World Bank PPI database. Data re-
garding the number of related policies were generated by 
searching the Peking University Law Legal Database using 
“PPP”, “BOT”, “BT”, and “concession” as keywords. Finan-
cial autonomy data were from Finance Statistics Yearbook, 
data regarding openness were from the China Statistical 
Yearbook, and financial development data were from the 
Financial Statistics Yearbook. Our sample covered the pe-
riod from 2008–2013. This research was extended only 
through 2013 because financial audit supervision indica-
tors were updated only to 2013. This paper used MATLAB 
7.0 simulation software to deal with missing data accord-
ing to the rules of data change.
3. Research results
3.1. Efficiency of Chinese infrastructure PPP 
projects in the construction and operation stages
MATLAB 7.0 programming software was used to calculate 
the two-stage DEA model of the efficiency of infrastruc-
ture PPP projects in both the construction and operation 
stages. The results are shown in Table  7. As shown in 
Table 7, the construction efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects fluctuated greatly as a whole. Infrastructure PPP 
projects in Shanghai kept a leading position on the effi-
ciency front. In comparison, infrastructure PPP projects 
in some western regions such as Qinghai and Ningxia 
maintained the highest levels of construction efficiency as 
well, even though they were faced with poor economic 
foundations. However, the construction efficiency of in-
frastructure PPP projects in Beijing, Hebei, and Fujian 
provinces presented the strongest rising trend. In 2007, 
Fujian province standardized the municipal engineer-
ing bidding process for infrastructure PPP projects, and 
gradually introduced a series of beneficial management 
measures including budget preparation, final acceptance 
management, and quality supervision, among other steps. 
Thus, the construction efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects in Fujian province showed an increase year af-
ter year. At the same time, the construction efficiency of 
infrastructure PPP projects in Gansu, Xinjiang, Guizhou, 
and Heilongjiang provinces showed a decrease year after 
year. These results were a consequence of huge infrastruc-
ture investment needs, poor natural conditions with high 
capital costs, and lack of institutional structures such as a 
bidding system for infrastructure projects, contract man-
agement, and quality supervision.
Overall, for the years examined, improvement in ef-
ficiency during the operation stage of infrastructure PPP 
projects progressed smoothly in comparison to fluctua-
tions in efficiency during the construction stage. The ef-
ficiency of the operation stage of infrastructure PPP pro-
jects fell in 2009 only. In addition, the infrastructure PPP 
projects in Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, and Hainan provinces 
consistently remained front-runners in terms of efficiency 
in the operation stage. However, the outlook for the ef-
ficiency of infrastructure PPP project operations in most 
of the developed areas, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shandong provinces, was not optimistic. These findings 
might have resulted from redundant investment and ex-
cessive construction that finally lost the scale effect of new 
infrastructure PPP projects. Thus, there was no obvious 
increase in the growth of social and economic develop-
ment in those regions. The efficiency of infrastructure 
PPP project operations in Guangdong province showed 
the most pronounced fluctuations in 2008, and kept a 
downward trend until experiencing a sharp rise in 2013. 
Table 6. Factors influencing the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects
Index Contents Measurement
Supervision Financial audit Number of violations of local financial regulations
Public participation Number of local environmental petitions
corruption Number of cases of corruption and bribery of public officials
Risk allocation Financial risk Government subsidies received by utilities companies/GDP
Operation risk Privatisation index
Control variables Number of policies Number of policies relating to PPPs promulgated by local government
Financial autonomy Provincial per capita expenditure / (central + provincial per capita expenditure 
per capita expenditure)
Openness Total import and export amount/GDP
Financial development Long–term loans of each province/GDP
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Table 7. Efficiency of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects in the construction and operation stages
Construction Operation
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Beijing 0.53 0.42 0.54 0.74 0.84 0.78 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.24
Tianjin 0.53 0.41 0.24 0.44 0.22 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hebei 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.36 0.51 0.55 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.51
Shanxi 0.62 0.34 0.38 0.60 0.48 1.00 0.76 0.68 0.70 0.59 0.77 0.58
Inner Mongolia 0.48 0.25 0.16 0.32 0.36 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00
Liaoning 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.19 0.18 0.30 0.66 0.70 0.77 0.86 0.98 0.93
Jilin 0.62 0.39 0.64 0.37 0.51 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.56 0.57
Heilong jiang 0.63 0.33 0.45 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.47
Shanghai 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.56
Jiangsu 0.35 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.62
Zhejiang 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.64
Anhui 0.37 0.44 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.61
Fujian 0.19 0.24 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.51 0.79 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.70
Jiangxi 0.41 0.39 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.68 0.64 0.70 0.78 0.90 0.88
Shandong 0.53 0.22 0.46 0.45 0.92 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.48
Henan 0.58 0.40 1.00 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.58
Hubei 1.00 0.28 0.61 0.64 0.43 0.53 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.40
Hunan 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.54
Guang dong 0.94 0.61 0.36 0.85 0.84 0.70 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.38 1.00
Guangxi 0.37 0.42 0.29 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.45
Hainan 0.56 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Chong qing 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.54 0.54 0.61 0.69 0.68 0.60
Sichuan 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.46
Guizhou 0.89 0.74 0.77 0.37 0.22 0.08 0.90 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
Yunnan 0.52 0.32 0.18 0.31 0.41 0.22 0.98 0.91 0.91 0.93 1.00 1.00
Shannxi 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.62 0.59 0.67 0.73 0.61 0.59
Gansu 1.00 0.57 0.67 0.60 0.46 0.24 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.43
Qinghai 0.90 1.00 0.72 0.91 0.82 1.00 0.88 0.70 1.00 0.98 0.75 0.80
Ningxia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.78 0.56 0.59 0.48 0.49
Xingjiang 0.76 0.47 0.69 0.41 0.29 0.28 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.37 0.34
Average 0.56 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66
Also, the efficiency of the operation stage of infrastructure 
PPP projects in Ningxia province presented the greatest 
significant decrease.
At this point, this paper offers further analysis of the 
efficiency of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects in both 
the construction and operation stages. Our results showed 
that the average efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects 
was valued at 0.47 in the construction stage and 0.63 in the 
operation stage. The areas that had double-high efficiency 
scores (i.e., strong performance in both the construction 
and operation stages) for infrastructure PPP projects in-
cluded Hainan, Qinghai, Shanxi, and Guizhou provinces. 
Most of infrastructure PPP projects were in underdevel-
oped areas, but they rendered good performance in both 
the construction and operation stages. The fundamental 
factors that promoted double-high efficiency were central 
government support and preferred tax status, as well as 
low land and labour costs. Therefore, the ratio of infra-
structure investment to GDP output had greater elasticity.
In contrast, the infrastructure PPP projects that had 
double-low efficiency scores (i.e., weak performance in 
both the construction and operation stages) were located 
in Chongqing, Anhui, Shandong, Hunan, Guangxi, and 
Heilongjiang provinces. Essentially, the economic foun-
dation determines the construction level of infrastructure 
PPP projects (Ke et al., 2010). Most of these areas are cen-
tral Chinese provinces faced with poor economic funda-
mentals and an absence of preferential policies, except for 
Shandong. Compared to the eastern region, the central and 
western regions are susceptible to financial constraints be-
cause of imbalanced economic and social development, 
and local government budgets for infrastructure construc-
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tion are insufficient. Furthermore, the provinces that had 
infrastructure PPP projects with high operating efficiency 
accompanied by construction inefficiency included Inner 
Mongolia, Tianjin, Yunnan, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Fujian, Ji-
angsu, and Shaanxi provinces. The areas that had projects 
with high construction efficiency and low operating ef-
ficiency included Henan, Jilin, Gansu, Sichuan, Xinjiang, 
Hubei, Beijing, Guangdong, and Shanghai provinces. These 
results suggested that infrastructure PPP projects in these 
provinces experienced unbalanced development between 
the infrastructure construction and operation stages.
3.2. Determinants analysis of construction and 
operations efficiency of Chinese infrastructure  
PPP projects
This paper used panel data of infrastructure PPP projects 
from 2008–2013, and a Tobit regression model with ran-
dom effects. Model 1 and Model 2 analysed factors influ-
encing the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in the 
construction stage, and Model 3 and Model 4 analysed fac-
tors influencing efficiency in the operation stage. Model 1 
and Model 3 considered the impact of all the explanatory 
variables on the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects 
during the construction and operation stages. Model 2 in-
vestigated only the influence of supervision on the efficien-
cy of infrastructure PPP projects in the construction stage. 
Model 4 examined only how risk allocation affected the 
efficiency of projects in the operation stage. Table 8 shows 
the regression results calculated by STATA14.0. Overall, 
the Rho value of each of the four models was more than 
0.6, indicating that the individual effects explained changes 
in the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects in the con-
struction and operation stages. The results of the regression 
analyses can be understood as follows.
Based on the above empirical results, Model  1 and 
Model  2 demonstrated that the efficiency of infrastruc-
ture PPP projects in the construction stage was affected 
significantly by the level of government supervision. This 
coincides with Sengupta (2006) and Xu et al. (2010), who 
found that the government’s responsibility in PPPs is to 
ensure adequate supervision according to the theory of 
public goods. Government supervision ensures construc-
tion partnership efficiency and optimises available re-
sources in line with broader policy objectives. Meanwhile, 
the government and the private sector exist in a principal–
agent relation in PPP projects. Due to asymmetric infor-
mation, the private sector often neglects the social ben-
efits of projects to make profits, and moral hazards arise, 
such as rent-seeking rights. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001) noted that the degree of economic fundamentals 
negatively correlates with regional corruption. In the cen-
tral and western regions, where economic foundations are 
relatively poor, government supervision is not transparent, 
which can breed corruption and cause inefficiency (Sen-
gupta, 2006; Xu et al., 2010). Similarly, Hammami et al. 
(2006) used the World Bank’s PPI database to verify the 
correlation between the government’s ability to control 
corruption and the investment performance of PPP pro-















































































Log likelihood 113.1638 111.7555 117.4431 117.1804
Rho 0.6811 0.6744 0.8883 0.8906
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jects. Infrastructure PPP projects developed under a more 
secure financial system and lower levels of corruption 
showed significantly better performance in terms of effi-
ciency. By comparison, public participation in supervision 
had no significant effect on the efficiency of infrastructure 
PPP projects, reflecting the imperfect nature of China’s 
public participation system. Public engagement in China 
is still relatively weak, due to not only the cost implications 
but also the possible delays that could be caused by public 
engagement. The problems of public engagement in PPP 
projects in China include the following: a lack of specific 
legislation or guidelines for public engagement in terms of 
content and procedures, no enthusiasm among construc-
tion practitioners to carry out public engagement since 
it could cause delays and increase costs, the traditional 
Chinese culture being conservative in voicing opinions, 
and insufficient participation by some groups (e.g. wom-
en, the elderly, and minorities) in the engagement process 
(Li, Ng, & Skitmore, 2012). In the absence of trust be-
tween the government and the public, public engagement 
is often a merely routine bureaucratic process in mainland 
China, where the implementation of participatory mecha-
nisms is still in its infancy (Li et al., 2013). Compared to 
mainland China, a framework is still absent in the case of 
Hong Kong (A.  P.  C. Chan, Lam, D.  W.  Chan, Cheung, 
& Ke, 2009). The ‘Introductory Guide to PPP,’ established 
by the Hong Kong government’s Efficiency Unit, provides 
little information about the requirements for public en-
gagement or specific mechanisms that can be adopted in 
the public engagement process for PPP projects. This may 
cause confusion for practitioners when trying to engage 
the public for PPP projects, which could lead to pro-
ject delays (Ng, Y. M. W. Wong, & J. M. W. Wong, 2012; 
Ng, J.  M.  W., Wong, & K.  K.  W. Wong, 2013). As the 
importance of public engagement increases, more effort 
needs be invested in improving the mechanism of public 
engagement.
Regarding the control variables, the impact of an open 
environment was noticeably positive during the construc-
tion stage. Openness increased the participation of foreign 
capital effectively and attracted advanced management 
techniques, thus promoting improvements in construction 
efficiency. The degree of financial autonomy had a signifi-
cantly negative impact on the efficiency of infrastructure 
PPP projects during the construction stage. In general, lo-
cal governments that have more financial autonomy have 
greater financial strength and feel freer to act. However, 
financial autonomy might also lead local governments to 
increase their investment in infrastructure PPP projects 
without sufficient consideration of market demand and 
background costs, such as the challenge of potential com-
petition. Blind pursuit of high GDP growth by Chinese 
officials ultimately could reduce the efficiency of infra-
structure PPP projects during the construction stage. In 
contrast, the level of financial development and the num-
ber of related legislative actions were not significant in-
fluences, suggesting that the private sectors had difficulty 
obtaining sufficient funding in lending markets. Therefore, 
China should continue to strengthen legislative support of 
the private sector to bolster participation.
Moreover, Model 3 and Model 4 showed that in 
comparison to supervision, risk allocation had a greater 
critical influence on the efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects in the operation stage. Of note was the strongly 
negative impact of lower levels of government involve-
ment. This finding indicated that the operation efficiency 
of infrastructure PPP projects became lower as more risk 
was transferred to the private sector. Absence of govern-
ment guarantees and other comprehensive support, such 
as risk compensation and tax incentives, were to blame. 
Government guarantee is an effective and common way 
to attract private sectors and control risks in the operation 
stage of PPP projects (Gilberto, 2000; Hammami et  al., 
2006; Wang, Cui, & Liu, 2018). Examples include the Lai-
bin B power plant in Guangxi Province and Beijing Sub-
way Line 4, where the central government and provincial 
governments offer loan and revenue guarantees to help 
reduce the risks of private investors. Infrastructure PPP 
projects are characterised by large investment amounts, 
long operation stages, and loan contracts with no recourse 
or limited recourse. To reduce the operational risks of en-
terprises and banks, it is necessary for the government to 
provide guarantees for infrastructure PPP projects in the 
operation stage (Ashiuri, Kashiani, & Molenaar, 2002). 
When a PPP project company is unable to continue op-
erating a project because of risks, a government guaran-
tee can encourage the bank to provide additional loans 
to ensure continued operation. This helps to avoid the 
loss of social efficiency caused by early project termina-
tion and guarantees the stability of infrastructure services 
(Wibowo, 2004; Wibowo et al., 2012). The private sector 
elements of PPP projects in mainland China are quite dif-
ferent from those in Western countries. State-owned en-
terprises, including central and local state-owned enter-
prises, are the most common private sectors for PPP pro-
jects in mainland China. In particular, large state-owned 
construction enterprises – such as China State Construc-
tion Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), China Railway 
Engineering Corporation (CREC), and China Communi-
cation Construction Corporation (CCCC) – are the main 
forces participating in PPP projects. The participation of 
state-owned enterprises in PPP projects has natural po-
litical advantages, and it is common for a large propor-
tion of financial subsidies to be granted to state-owned 
enterprises with political connections in mainland China 
(Zhang et al., 2016; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2018b). However, 
state-owned construction enterprises mainly participate in 
the construction stage of PPP projects and lack the ability 
to operate or manage in the operation stage (Osei-Kyei, 
Chan, Javed, & Ameyaw, 2017). As a result, the influence 
of financial support from local governments does not sig-
nificantly affect infrastructure PPP efficiency in the opera-
tion stage. Consequently, risk-sharing models cannot play 
their intended role (Zhang et al., 2015).
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Among control variables, the most noteworthy result 
was that financial autonomy generated a significantly posi-
tive impact on the efficiency of infrastructure PPP projects 
in the operation stage, while the impact on the efficiency 
of infrastructure PPP projects in the construction stage 
was significantly negative. A higher degree of financial au-
tonomy allowed local governments to provide more suf-
ficient financial support over the long operating period of 
infrastructure PPP projects, along with more consistent 
policy commitments.
4. Implications for infrastructure PPP projects
This study’s findings have several implications for the 
practise of infrastructure PPP projects, for both the pub-
lic sector and private investors, including property scien-
tists interested in PPPs. Specifically, the findings can guide 
practitioners regarding strategic management that should 
be adopted for public participation to meet stakeholders’ 
expectations in the construction stage. The results indi-
cate that the level of government supervision is the most 
influential factor in the efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects in the construction stage. Sengupta (2006) noted 
that the government’s responsibility in PPPs is to ensure 
adequate supervision to ensure construction efficiency. It 
is very important to clearly divide management responsi-
bilities between the central government and local govern-
ments. To prevent the pursuit of short-term benefits, the 
central government should focus on large-scale infrastruc-
ture projects with significant social impact. Since local 
governments are the initiators and managers of most in-
frastructure PPP projects, projects should be selected ac-
cording to feasibility analyses by local governments. Fur-
ther, it is essential to establish specialised authorities and 
associated organisations to manage infrastructure PPP 
projects, whose function should be to supervise pre-pro-
ject approval, selection, and contract management. These 
departments would also conduct mid-cycle performance 
evaluations, supervise post-project evaluations, and is-
sue summaries of the results of completed infrastructure 
projects. The results also indicate that public engagement 
is another important influencing factor in construction-
stage project efficiency, based on satisfying the need for 
public service. This suggests that private investors and 
public sectors should adopt adequate measures to meet 
the core needs of the public. Further, the private sector 
should disclose information about project construction 
that is conducive to public supervision and the improve-
ment of construction efficiency. This will enable the public 
sector to establish an effective mechanism for engagement 
in infrastructure PPP projects.
The results also show that risk allocation is critical for 
project efficiency in the operation stage. This is not sur-
prising since infrastructure PPP projects have long opera-
tion stages, and their loan contracts have no recourse or 
limited recourse. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
public sector provide guarantees for infrastructure PPP 
projects in the operation stage to reduce the operational 
risks of private investors. Further, it is necessary to set up 
mixed-ownership special-purpose-vehicle (SPV) com-
panies to isolate risks between governments and private 
sector investors. SPV companies should receive joint in-
vestments from the government, the private sector, and 
appropriate third parties. SPV companies should also allo-
cate financial and operating risks reasonably to the stake-
holders who can best manage those risks. For example, the 
central government should commit to monitoring changes 
in demand and policy, thereby shifting inflation risk. The 
private sector should bear the risks of cost overruns, con-
struction timeouts, and controllable risk behaviours on 
the part of private industries. Third parties could assume 
the remaining risks.
This study’s findings also suggest the need for an im-
proved evaluation process for good value for money in 
infrastructure PPP projects. Feasibility and the bidding 
process should be evaluated in the construction stage to 
determine whether private sector participation is achiev-
ing a high degree of good value for money. Moreover, the 
evaluation index of good value for money for infrastruc-
ture PPP projects should be refined according to stage 
(Hu et al., 2014). Specifically, the evaluation index of good 
value for money in the construction stage includes con-
struction costs, construction time, and the physical prop-
erties of the facility. Construction cost mainly refers to the 
design, construction, upgrading, renovation, and overhaul 
expenses of PPP projects, as well as the value of fixed as-
sets, land use rights, and intangible assets. The operation-
stage evaluation index includes operating costs, operating 
risks, and quality of services. Operating cost mainly refers 
to raw materials, equipment, and labour expenses, as well 
as management expenses, selling expenses, and financial 
expenses arising from both long- and short-term loans. 
Thus, local government assessments can complement the 
evaluation indexes of infrastructure PPP projects or ad-
just index weights according to various infrastructure PPP 
project types and industry characteristics.
Conclusions
China will continue to need increasing numbers of infra-
structure PPP projects to support its growing economy. 
This paper used data from infrastructure PPP projects 
conducted by thirty provincial governments in China from 
2008–2013 to evaluate the efficiency of infrastructure PPP 
projects in both the construction and operation stages. In 
addition, we conducted an analysis of the factors that in-
fluenced the efficiency of the construction and operation 
phases of the projects. Our findings indicated that for op-
erational efficiency of the infrastructure PPP projects from 
2008–2013, efficiency improvements progressed smoothly 
in the operation stage as compared to fluctuations in ef-
ficiency during the construction stage. Infrastructure PPP 
projects in Qinghai, Ningxia, and Shanghai provinces were 
highly efficient in the construction stage. Infrastructure 
PPP projects in Beijing rose the most in construction ef-
ficiency, but demonstrated poor efficiency in the operation 
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stage because of the descending scale effect. In addition, 
the level of government supervision had a greater impact 
on the construction efficiency of infrastructure PPP pro-
jects, while the efficiency of projects in the operation stage 
was affected significantly by risk allocation.
This study’s results reveal the efficiency and determi-
nants of Chinese infrastructure PPP projects in the con-
struction and operation stages. This research contributes 
to the study of efficiency evaluation strategies and pro-
vides practical information for the application and imple-
mentation of infrastructure PPP projects. It also identifies 
the factors that influence the efficiency of infrastructure 
PPP projects in the construction and operation stages 
and that maximise the benefits derived from implement-
ing PPP strategies. Furthermore, with the development 
of infrastructure PPP projects and the database transpar-
ency of CPPPC, it is of great value to include preparation 
and transfer stage data for infrastructure PPP projects in 
the empirical study. Further research is needed on how 
to establish a comprehensive infrastructure PPP project 
efficiency evaluation system in consideration of more po-
litical factors.
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